Economic rights (TPO: THIRD PART OWNERSHIP)

Updated 12/16/2019

Written by

Pablo Bruera

lawyer

Mail : derechosdelfutbol@gmail.com

Whatsapp: +54 9221 618-7294

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter we analyze the origin of economic rights in football as well as the sanctions that some clubs have suffered for violating these rules imposed by FIFA and which were adhered to by all associations.

On the other hand, we examine the FIFA regulations through the regulations of the Players Transfer Statute, the regulations that regulate this institute in Argentina, in other countries and the FIFA resolution that authorizes players to be holders of their economic rights as of June 26, 2018.

Finally, we review to draw some conclusions after FIFA, in 2015, prohibited clubs from giving up the economic rights of their players to third parties since it has been a few years since its implementation.

We anticipate that, according to our judgment, this model in relation to economic rights has not been successful and, in view of the new investments and actors that come to football, this prohibition will continue to be violated in greater depth.

DEFINITION

The economic right arises from the value of the transfer of a player from one club to another. It derives from federative law and originates from the money paid by one club to another for the transfer of a player.

Later we will see that economic rights have specific and very different characteristics with respect to federative rights.

The TPO (Third Party Ownership) consist in that the economic rights of the players are in the hands of third parties such as in those of an agent, agency, investment fund, etc. and they are the ones that benefit from the future percentage of the player's transfer.

The economic right of a soccer player is a patrimonial part of the federative rights that clubs have over the athlete. In other words, economic rights are based on the monetary value of federative rights.

Prohibition vs. regulation

The transfer of economic rights has been the most important source of financing for clubs in Latin America and in some European countries.

The Iberian and Portuguese league filed a demand in FIFA for economic rights not to be prohibited, proposing to implement a regulatory model that avoids abuse and malpractice, arguing that the presence of third parties strengthens the clubs and helps to stop the talent drain to the richest leagues.

Those who advocated the most for the prohibition of these rights were former UEFA President Michel Platini and the international professional footballers' union, arguing that third-party ownership of players raises questions about money laundering and other illegal activities, in addition to go against ethical principles and Human Rights.

"The presence of third parties who possess a part of the rights of the

footballers is a modern form of slavery and it had to end, "he said

Michel Platini. "Today, it is a shame to see players whose arms belong to a person, one leg is from a pension fund based on who knows where and a third person owns the foot," said Platini as an argument to end this practice.

This form of TPO was very widespread in Brazil and Argentina, and was widely exploited by the Portuguese and Spanish clubs, who opposed the FIFA ban outright.

The risks seen by the promoters of the ban can be summarized in four main ideas:

  1. That FIFA lose control to exercise sanctions, since it is evident that it could not do it to third parties.

  2. That investors have influence on the performance of footballers. 3-That the players were considered as merchandise -following Platin's reasoning- and not as true workers.

4-That an advantage is generated between the clubs that hire third parties with respect to those that do not.

Sports law as an autonomous branch

The institute we are analyzing proves, once again, that sports law is an autonomous branch of law.

A soccer player generates, with his transfer, an economic resource that, in general, workers from other fields do not obtain. This type of employment is regulated by norms and jurisprudence that make this activity specific.

We can say that, in no other occupation, a worker for moving from one company to another generates economic rights.

This branch of law has come to fill a regulatory gap and to respond to a social phenomenon that mobilizes crowds.

The prohibition of the transfer of economic rights

Since 2015, FIFA has prohibited clubs from handing over players' financial rights to third parties.

The reform produced serious contradictions such as, for example, in the Swiss Code of Obligations, in the community norms or in the constitutional regulations of the different countries.

Indeed, the restriction on the movement of capital is prohibited and, on the other hand, the Swiss constitution guarantees economic freedom as an elementary right. However, the TAS endorsed the prohibition imposed by FIFA, recognizing that European regulations have not been violated by these regulations. At this point, the TAS -from the prohibition- changes its jurisprudence since it had said that the transfer of economic rights was totally legitimate. He even maintained that the player's will was not even necessary to make the transfer of economic rights because it did not imply anything concrete regarding the life of the athlete.

As we have said, the central motivations of this prohibition are that employers, investment funds, etc., avoid deciding on a player's sports life, creating conflicts of interest.

In this way, it seeks to preserve the autonomy of the clubs in the transfer of players.

Origin of economic rights

The economic rights of soccer players at the hands of third parties arose from the 90s, as a way to obtain resources for the clubs without having to part with the player.

What the club yielded was a percentage of a future sale, making a contract with one or more third parties.

The novelty of the system was that money was advanced from a possible future sale without having to part with the player.

In order for the third party to obtain the benefit, the conditional obligation of its future sale had to be fulfilled. In this way, the clubs also reduced the risk regarding the footballer.

THE CASE OF THE BELGA FC SERAING CLUB

FIFA sanctioned the Belgian club for violating regulations regarding the clubs not being able to assign their financial rights to third parties.

The sanction consisted in that, for four seasons, the club does not incorporate more players and pays a millionaire fine, without considering removing points. Articles 18 bis and 18 ter of the regulation of the Player Transfer Statute were violated since the club sold a part of the economic rights of various players to third parties that influenced the club's policy, affecting autonomy in the transfer of footballers.

The TAS endorsed this prohibition, arguing that the restrictions on the freedom of movement of capital are justified in order to be able to meet the sporting objectives of the clubs to avoid possible conflicts of interest, as well as the use of football as an instrument of money laundering or the entry of capital of dubious origin. Also, to prevent match arrangements from arising. This organism lowered the sanction to three seasons, without being able to incorporate players.

In turn, the European Commission in Brussels rejected a lawsuit against the FIFA ban, filed by the investment fund Doyen and the Belgian club Seraing. This body ratifies the general principle that transfers by third parties generate a conflict of interest.

The Brussels Court of Appeal declares the submission clauses to the TAS of FIFA and UEFA illegal

The Brussels Court of Appeal issued a judgment on August 29, 2018, in which it declares that the arbitration clauses contained in the statutes of FIFA, UEFA and its member federations (therefore, of all clauses similar contained in the statutes of the federations of all other sports) are illegal since they violate article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 47 of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The Court of Appeal, after stressing that the national federations participate in the application of the FIFA and UEFA rules (in this specific case, the rules on the TPO, the Financial Fair Play and the arbitration procedures), considers that: “ FIFA and UEFA cannot dispute that the solution chosen by the court may allow any FIFA or UEFA regulation to be challenged before the jurisdictions of any country, also directing action against the national federation in question, since it would hinder expectations legitimate of FIFA and UEFA to be sued before the Swiss courts. Indeed, the solution stems from the international nature (global for FIFA, European for UEFA) of the activities of these parties and the pyramid structure of the sport organization, so that both the highest international associations participate in it. level as the national federations ”.

In summary, not only can FIFA and UEFA no longer shield themselves in the TAS, but they can also be sued before any court of a State, in all countries where their regulations take effect thanks to the collaboration of the corresponding national federation.

The court claims that these clauses violate article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights and article 47 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Lawyers for the RFC Seraing, Jean-Louis DUPONT, Martin HISSEL and Patrick HENRY, declare: “In view of this judgment and for the future, it is illusory that international federations try to impose arbitration before the TAS on everyone and everything . Furthermore, as regards the past, it is highly probable that the validity of many sentences given can be questioned.

by the TAS, because of the illegality of the clauses that imposed the competence of the TAS ”.

FIFA welcomes the ruling of the Brussels Court of Appeals on the FIFA TPO and TPI rules

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The Brussels Court of Appeals has dismissed an appeal from Doyen Sports Investments and the Belgian club FC Seraing seeking the illegality of FIFA's third-party property (TPO) and third-party influence (TPI) rules. FIFA's TPO and TPI rules are set out in Articles 18bis and 18ter of the Player Status and Transfer Regulations (RSTP).

In the decision, which was issued on December 12, 2019, the Court of Appeal recognizes the full effect of res judicata, a final decision that is no longer subject to appeal, of the award of the Court of Arbitration for Sport on the same matter issued on March 9, 2017 and the judgment of the Swiss Federal Court handed down on February 20, 2018, and confirms the validity of the disciplinary decisions issued by the FIFA disciplinary committees that sanctioned FC Seraing for having violated the rules of TPO and TPI. In addition to that, the Brussels Court of Appeal confirms that the appellants did not present convincing arguments before the Court to doubt the legitimate objectives of the FIFA rules.

FIFA Legal Director Emilio Garcia commented on this new ruling as follows: "Once again, an independent court declares that there is no reason to doubt the validity of FIFA's rules on TPO and TPI under the Applicable law. These FIFA rules are essential to preserve the independence of clubs and players and to guarantee the integrity of matches and competitions. "

The resolution approved by the Brussels Court of Appeal also decided to impose the costs of the proceedings on Doyen Sports and FC Seraing.

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The Roberto Heras case

The plaintiffs relied on the ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court in the Roberto Heras case.

The Spanish high court declared the sentence against the cyclist null and void for testing positive in the Spain 2005 tour based on the fact that Heras did not have to accept the TAS competition without having voluntarily submitted to it.

The consent of the athletes has not been free or voluntary, so compulsory arbitration is unconstitutional for Spain.

Other cases of sanctions

Al Arabi from Qatar was sanctioned with a fine of CHF 187,500 for various contracts that allowed a third party to influence the independence of the club by concluding third-party property agreements in violation of paragraphs 4 and 5 of art 18 ter RSTP, as well as a violation of confidentiality and the failure to enter correct and mandatory information in the international transfer matching system, in the framework of the transfers of seven different players.

Sporting CP de Portugal, with a fine of CHF 110,000 for two contracts that allowed a third party to influence the independence of the club, as well as for not registering an existing third-party ownership agreement in ITMS and for not entering correct instructions and information and mandatory in ITMS.

Sl Benfica of Portugal was sanctioned with a total fine of CHF 150,000 for two contracts that allowed a third party to influence the independence of the club. Rayo Vallecano from Spain, with a fine of CHF 55,000 for contracts that allowed a third party to influence the independence of the club, as well as for not registering an ownership agreement of an existing third party and for not entering the correct and mandatory information in ITMS.

RC Celta de Vigo from Spain was sanctioned with a fine of CHF 65,000 for signing a contract that allowed SL Benfica to influence the independence of the club, as well as for using ITMS as a negotiation tool.

CHARACTERISTICS OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS

These rights are divisible, can be divided and their ownership can be shared as opposed to federative rights that do not have any of these characteristics.

The holder of the economic right acquires an expectation of a future profit.

Economic rights are a financing mechanism for clubs and, before the ban, they were an investment tool.

The holder of the economic right may be different from the club that owns the federative right.

As we said, federative rights cannot be divided or divided, they can only belong to one club at a time. This right, then, cannot be partially transferred.

Origin of the reform

In 2008, FIFA added article 18 bis in the regulations for the Players Transfer Statute. This provision only prohibited third parties from influencing clubs and ending up controlling the career of the soccer player, but there was no prohibition on third parties investing in the economic rights of the player.

At the 64th FIFA Congress in 2014, Geoff Thompson, president of the Dispute Resolution Chamber, presented a summary of the ownership of the footballer's economic rights by third parties. Studies commissioned by FIFA concluded that few people have very strong market power and create areas of conflict of interest.

At that time, it was estimated that the economic value was 360 million dollars annually, representing 9.7% of international transfers.

RETJ regulations

Article 18 bis: Influence of third parties on clubs

  1. No club will enter into a contract that allows the opposing club (s) and vice versa or third parties, to assume a position by which they can influence labor matters and transfers related to the independence, politics or performance of the teams. of the club.

  2. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary sanctions on clubs that do not comply with the obligations stipulated in this article.

Article 18 ter: Ownership of the economic rights of players by third parties

  1. No club or player may sign a contract with a third party that grants said third party the right to participate, partially or totally, in the value of a future transfer of a player from one club to another, or that grants him rights related to future transfers or with the value of future signings.

  2. The prohibition in section 1 will take effect on May 1, 2015.

  3. The contracts affected by section 1, signed prior to May 1, 2015, will remain valid until their contractual expiration date. However, its validity cannot be prolonged.

  4. The duration of the agreements contemplated in section 1, signed between January 1, 2015 and April 30, 2015, may not exceed one year from the date of their entry into force.

  5. At the end of April 2015, all current contracts affected by section 1 must be registered in the TMS. All clubs that have signed this type of contract must upload them in full - including possible annexes and amendments - in the TMS, specifying the details of the third party involved, the player's full name and the duration of the contract.

  6. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee may impose disciplinary measures on clubs and players who do not comply with the obligations stipulated in this article.

Definition of "third parties" by the RETJ, point 14.

"Third is the part outside the two clubs between which a player is transferred, or to any of the previous clubs in which the player was previously registered."

Even the soccer player himself is considered third, to whom the prohibition also applies. In other words, the player is prevented from participating in his own transfer from collecting a percentage of the economic rights that he himself generates.

Latest decisions of the FIFA Disciplinary Committee on third-party regulations

The FIFA Disciplinary Committee decided, at its last session, that players should not be considered "third parties" according to definition 14 and art. 18 ter of the regulation on the Statute and Transfer of Players (RETJ).

In four different cases - the clubs Werder Bremen (Germany), Panathinaikos (Greece), CSD Colo-Colo (Chile) and Universitario de Deportes (Peru) - signed contracts with some of their players that gave the latter the right to receive a specific compensation (a fixed amount or a percentage) for your future transfer to another club.

The amounts promised to the players were considered part of the remuneration due under contracts with their clubs. In this regard, the FIFA Disciplinary Committee found that players cannot be considered third parties with respect to their future transfers and, therefore, the fact that they receive specific compensation, either in the form of a fixed amount or a percentage Due to his future transfer to a new club, it is not considered a violation of FIFA regulations on economic rights of players by third parties.

The Tevez case

In 2007, the English club West Ham signed a contract with the Media Sports Investment (MSI) recognizing that all of the economic rights of the player Tevez belonged to the company.

That is, the company was the one that decided regarding a future sale of the player.

When the footballer is sold and these contracts are known, FIFA sanctions the club with a millionaire fine, but without a point discount.

As a result of this case, FIFA decides to change the regulations so that similar situations do not arise.

In December 2007, art 18 bis (influence of third parties in clubs) is established in the RETJ.

THE REGULATION IN ARGENTINA

SCHEME OF RECORDING AND ARCHIVING OF ASSIGNMENTS OF ECONOMIC BENEFITS FOR CONTRACT TRANSFERS

  1. A special system of annotation and file of assignments of economic benefits derived from transfers authorized by art. Is created within the Argentine Football Association. 14 of law 20,160.

    1. The transfer must be recorded, with the individualization of the club and footballer's contract, the transfer of which determines the economic benefit.

    2. In case of non-compliance in the annotation, the members of the directing committee of the assigning club will be responsible under the terms of art. 6th, inc. b), sub 2) of the Statute-AFA.

  2. Individuals –even the athlete himself- or regularly constituted legal entities, all in accordance with legal, statutory and regulatory regulations, may be holders of economic rights over the transfer of the contract for professional soccer players. In no case, the exercise of such economic rights may affect the athlete's freedom of work, any contractual provision to the contrary being void. If the footballer withholds the fixed sum and / or percentage of a future transfer, it will correspond to comply with the same precautions as those established for the transfer (except those indicated in point 8, sub a), sub b), sub d) and sub i) of this regime). The club will be oblivious to the legal dealings made by the footballer with third parties regarding the retained economic benefits.

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2.1) Such rights will result in a share of the liquid profit on the economic result produced by the transfer between clubs of the contracts of professional soccer players.

2.2) Said benefit must remain up to a minimum of 30% (thirty percent) at the head of the club in which the contract is registered, under the terms of Law 20,160.

2.3) The transfer of economic rights by their private owners may only be in favor of the club in which the player's contract is registered, unless the institution expresses agreement of the transfer to third parties (in writing, indicating the ceded participation, the data of the new transferee and the economic guidelines). The new assignment must strictly comply with the obligations resulting from the present regime.

2.4) The economic rights assigned may be subject to shared ownership. The holders of percentages of assigned economic rights share the same degree.

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3) Conflicts of interest between the club and the third party transferor of economic rights do not affect the employment contract concluded under the terms of Law 20,160 and CCT 430/75.

4) The transfers or assignments of the employment contract, regulated in articles 14 and 15, law 20,160 and article 9 of the Collective Labor Agreement No. 430/75, are governed according to the decision of the person who is the holder before the registration of the signed contract in the terms of article 3 of the Professional Soccer Player Statute.

5) The special regime that is implemented hereby only reaches the extrinsic qualification of the instrument prior to its entry, regardless of the genetic cause of the legal business.

6) The presentation for the annotation and / or modification in AFA of the ownership of the assignment of the economic rights indicated in point 1 must come from the club in which the player's sports rights are registered (art. 3 Law 20.160) .

  1. The institution may not transfer third parties and / or waive this obligation.

  2. It must be accompanied: a) the transfer instrument with individualization of the contract (s) with the soccer player (s), its validity and percentage of ceded benefits; b) the instruments as determined in the following points 7 and 8.

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7) It is up to the club that makes the presentation:

  1. attach a certified copy before a notary public of the minutes of the board of directors by which the transfer of the economic right to register was authorized;

  2. enter the inscription within the term of thirty (30) calendar days from the signing of the assignment agreement;

  3. responsibility for the accuracy of the data contained therein;

  4. the authorization to the AFA to give publicity by the means that the latter considers of the assignment, its parts, its financial terms and any other data that may arise from the instrument to be annotated and filed.

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8) It is the responsibility of the assignee:

  1. declare to know the legal, conventional and regulatory norms regarding the temporary extension of the contracts and the loss of the club's rights over them due to their expiration or any other cause with scope to the freedom of hiring the footballer;

  2. declare to know exactly the terms of the contract in force between the club and the footballer in respect of which the transfer of economic benefits for its transfer is made;

  3. authorize the AFA to publicize, by any means, the transfer legal business, its parts, its financial terms and any other data that may arise from the instrument to be noted and filed;

  4. for its own account and cost, comply with the obligations that correspond to social security (decree 1212 PEN and its regulations), administrative expenses and any other that may correspond to the moment in which the transfer is made. The documents issued by the assignee must be:

    1. legal persons: with the attachment of the instruments that accredit the legal personality and its representation, duly certified;

    2. natural persons: with certified signature.

9) Within the framework of what is required by Article 6 subsection d) sub 1) of the AFA Statute and by the General Accounting Plan approved accordingly, and in accordance with the provisions of the particular professional technical standards for non-profit entities, each institution must present, as

Complementary information to the basic financial statements, as an annex and with the pertinent explanatory notes, a statement of the evolution of intangible assets, specifying those corresponding to the assignment of economic benefits - or its guarantee - by transfer of contract with details of:

  1. transfer percentages;

  2. assignees with sufficient data for their individualization;

  3. opening balances, variations and ending balances;

  4. separation of the original values ​​of accumulated amortizations;

10) The Argentine Football Association will reject the annotation when all the requirements established in the present regime and those that may be required in the regulations are not fulfilled.

11) The regime established hereby is mandatory from the date of its approval by the H. Executive Committee.

12) In order to start the informative process according to the previous article, the institutions reached by the present regime must present until December 28, 2005, a status of the transfers made regarding their relationship with professional soccer players, with detail of the extremes (percentages, fixed amounts, conditions and, finally, how much other data is of interest to communicate). Said presentation will be made as a sworn statement, which must be signed by the statutory authorities empowered for this purpose. - In the event of non-compliance with said presentation, the AFA will reject any future annotations of assignments of economic benefits derived from the transfer of soccer contracts.

NOTE: The aforementioned resolution was approved unanimously. -

  1. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE AFA

The special bulletin N ° 3819 was written because it was becoming increasingly difficult to determine the right holder since the legal appearance was not always revealing of the true economic situation.

It was about fighting clandestinity and publicizing these acts, so a procedure was created to record the holders of the transfer of economic rights on the proceeds of the transfers of the players, or when the discharge served as a guarantee, a archive.

This regime tended to receive the documents referring to the rights they transmit, as well as to regulate them.

2. THE GENERAL RESOLUTION N ° 3740 OF THE AFIP

THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC REVENUE ADMINISTRATION

RESOLVES:

Article 1 - The contracts concluded from May 1, 2015 inclusive, may grant economic rights only to a soccer club or the professional soccer player involved, not being able to grant third parties the right to participate, partially or totally , the value of the future transfer of a player from one club to another or grant them rights related to future signings or the value of future signings.

The subjects - clubs or players - obliged to act as information agents and, where appropriate, withholding agents, in accordance with the provisions of the general resolutions in force, will continue to report in accordance with the provisions of said regulations, taking into account that such contracts may grant financial rights only to a soccer club or the professional soccer player involved.

Article 2 - This Federal Administration, for the purposes of control, will carry out computer crossings with the information referring to the contracts in force as of April 30, 2015, that the "International Federation of Football Association" (FIFA) has registered in the System of Transfer Correlation (TMS).

3.FUNDAMENTALS OF AFIP

General resolution No. 3740 makes it impossible for the economic rights of the players to be in the hands of third parties.

This occurs within the framework of article 18 ter incorporated by FIFA, in which no club or player may sign a contract that grants third parties the right to participate in the value of a future transfer of a player from a club

to another, or that grants rights related to future signings or the value of future signings.

The objective of the resolution is to make soccer operations more transparent, strengthening the finances of the clubs to ensure their social purpose. The aim is to avoid maneuvers, optimizing control measures.

Likewise, Resolution No. 3374 of the AFIP establishes an information regime in charge of the AFA and the First A and National B clubs. The AFIP also has a procedure for registering transfers of federal and economic rights. of the players. AFIP Resolution No. 3376 creates the “dynamic list of tax havens

sports ”, available on the AFIP institutional website. This body must be informed of the separation of the professional player from the club in which he provided services.

4. Collective agreement of the soccer player No. 557/2009, article 8.6

  1. The transfer of professional footballers contracts or rights included therein, or services or "passes" of footballers -professionals or amateurs- in favor of individuals or companies or legal or ideal persons or entities of any kind that do not intervene directly in the dispute of soccer tournaments organized by the AFA, or the leagues affiliated to it. The nullity of the transfer, which will eventually be made in violation of this prohibition, must be declared by the AFA or, where appropriate, by the Labor courts, and it will also matter, the automatic termination of the transferor's link with the footballer and freedom of contracting or action, with the right to enter into a contract or registration with the entity of your choice, from the country or from abroad.

THE NORMATIVE IN OTHER COUNTRIES

In Brazil, Law No. 12395 of the year 2011 establishes, in article 27-R, the nullity of contracts signed between clubs and third parties or between them and athletes, except when it is the subject of an agreement or collective labor agreement.

In Colombia, the Federation updated its regulations in the sense of the prohibition. It reaches even the players who on their own

transfer can only receive 8% of that value as economic participation.

In Uruguay, President Tabaré Vázquez signed a decree-law that prevents institutions from handing over the rights of athletes to a businessman or institutions without legal status recognized by the state. The regulations block bridge passes and apply sworn declarations for transfers. Penalties for noncompliance go up to disenrollment.

In Spain, the RFEF adheres to the ban through circular 48, which reminds its affiliates of articles 18 bis and 18 ter of the RETJ.

In the case of England, the change was not great since it had been adapted to this new regulation for years.

Widespread breach of the ban

Beyond the intentions of UEFA and FIFA, the economic involvement of third parties in football remains a common practice.

Economic rights have been prohibited by law, but in reality they are one of the most important sources of resources for many clubs in various countries.

It is in daily use for clubs and players to give third parties, partially or totally, the economic rights. In general, football federations allow - by default - this way of financing it. They close their eyes to this reality as a mechanism to alleviate the serious economic crisis that the clubs are going through, who continue to transfer these rights in order to finance their institutions.

In other words, the FIFA regulations have been ineffective and inefficient to eradicate third parties and prevent them from benefiting from the profits that football produces.

The prohibition appears as an exaggeration since if the objective is transparency, it was enough to regulate, control and punish. FIFA regulations were sufficient to regulate, without prohibiting.

What is not clear is a general sanctioning and exemplifying control. Also, we can think that the prohibition widens the gap between rich and poor clubs, because the latter used the mechanism to retain top players and sustain their sports activities.

The idea that what soccer produces must remain in soccer has not been sustained. In Europe, economic investment in football continues to grow.

Investment funds, companies, even some of the states, buy shares of the clubs that are sports corporations.

Investment from China, Russia, Arab Countries, etc. they inject exorbitant capital into football. It would give the impression that, far from being an inflationary bubble, more and more powerful players have come to this sport to stay.

In countries like Argentina, where soccer is organized through non-profit civil societies, private money comes in from all sides, with the problem that these investments cannot be made transparent. Before the FIFA ban, private companies entered football through management, as happened with numerous football clubs. These “managements” were true agents of administration when the clubs went bankrupt, and were charged with a percentage or all of the economic rights of the players.

Since the ban, the "managers" in Argentina have ceased to be interested in the business of football administration.

In Mexico or Colombia, the money that reaches football, in some cases, is of dubious origin and this sport ends up serving as money laundering, something that FIFA has clearly wanted to avoid.

Between the 1980s and 1990s, it is assumed that money came into football that came from drug cartels, to such an extent that the Mexican Football Federation, in 2003, disaffiliated Querétaro, related to organized crime.

Some soccer club owners were discovered to be linked to the drug and that relationship, beyond the new regulations, seems to have not been severed.

Player transfer is an appetizing tool for money laundering. However, the mechanisms to resolve it have not yet been found.

The sanctions for violating the prohibition of economic rights, as we have seen, have been punctual and have not served as a remedy.

In Latin America, the cessation of the flow of private capital would undoubtedly generate an economic crisis in most clubs, but control mechanisms are needed to ensure the legitimacy of the funds.

In Europe, investment funds have revolutionized the finances of leagues such as the French, English, Spanish, German, etc.

The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA), created in 2005 by Emir Khalifa Al-Thani, owner of the French club PSG, is the one who invests in the oil and gas funds of the state of Qatar. Actors like these are the ones who have come to football to pay multi-million dollar contracts and create a new dimension in football finance.

It is evident that the prohibition generates underground issues to such an extent that, for example, clubs are bought to function as sports tax havens.

It is time to think of new rules, more rigorous controls and a jurisprudence according to the times in which football lives.

© 2019 Association of Experts on soccer rights

Mail: derechosdelfutbol@gmail.com

Whatsapp: +54 9221 618-7294

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